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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4620 
___________ 
 
LESHIA I. ROBINSON-JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. Civ. No. 1:11-cv-01206) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 20, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 24, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Leshia I. Robinson-Jones appeals pro se from an order of the District Court 
affirming the administrative denial of her application for disability insurance benefits, 
and the District Court’s judgment in favor of the Commissioner.  We will affirm. 
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I. 
 In 2008, Robinson applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the 
Social Security Act (the "Act").1  Robinson alleged disability as of November 2003 on 
the basis of back and neck injury, vision problems, emotional stress, asthma, and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease.  Robinson’s claims were initially denied, and she 
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took place on 
October 5, 2010.  At the administrative hearing, Robinson amended the alleged onset date 
of her disability to August 7, 2008, when she was fifty-three years old.  The ALJ found 
that Robinson was not under a disability prior to July 28, 2010, but became disabled on 
that date when her age category changed.   
Robinson appealed, and the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration 
declined further review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision.  Robinson 
then sought judicial review, and both Robinson and the Commissioner filed motions for 
summary judgment.  In November 2013, the District Court entered an order denying 
Robinson’s motion and granting the Commissioner’s motion, thus affirming the ALJ’s 
decision.  On December 3, 2013, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the 
Commissioner.  Robinson timely appealed.  
                                              
1 Robinson previously filed a disability insurance benefits application in February 2006, 
which resulted in a final decision dated August 6, 2008, denying her claim.  Robinson 
appealed to the District Court.  Robinson-Jones v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 10-00588 (D. 
Del. Mar. 28, 2012).  By Order entered March 28, 2012, judgment was entered in favor of 
the Commissioner and against Robinson, and she did not appeal.  
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we 
exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is deferential and is 
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.   
See, e.g., Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011).  Substantial evidence is 
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Fargnoli v. 
Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted).  Where findings 
are supported by substantial evidence, they are “conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see 
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 To qualify for disability benefits, an applicant must demonstrate that she is 
“unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 
months.”  42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).  Further, the applicant’s physical or mental 
impairments must be “of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do [her] previous 
work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any 
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . .”  42 
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 
 A five-step, sequential evaluation is used to determine whether an applicant 
is disabled.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.  The Commissioner must determine: (1) whether the 
applicant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset 
date; (2) whether the applicant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; 
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(3) whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listed 
impairment; (4) whether, despite the severe impairment, the applicant retains the residual 
functional capacity (“RFC”)2 to perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the 
applicant is capable of performing other jobs that exist in the national economy, 
considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC.  § 404.1520(a)(4); Poulos v. 
Comm'r, 474 F.3d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Only the fifth step is at issue here, where the ALJ determined that Robinson 
had the RFC to perform sedentary work.3  The ALJ further determined that, prior to July 
28, 2010, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that 
Robinson could have performed.  Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Robinson was not 
under a disability prior to July 28, 2010. 
III. 
 In her motion for summary judgment, Robinson sought remand and/or an 
award of benefits on four grounds, including that the Commissioner erred as a matter of 
                                              
2 The term “RFC” addresses what a claimant can still do despite her limitations.              
§ 404.1545(a)(1).  It is assessed using all relevant evidence from the record, including 
statements from medical sources and a claimant’s own description of limitations.   
§ 404.1545(a)(3).   
3 In determining the physical exertion requirements of work in the national economy, jobs 
are classified as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy.  “Sedentary work 
involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying 
articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.”  § 404.1567(a). 
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law in failing to accord adequate weight to the opinion and assessment of her long-time 
treating physician, Dr. Ronald Goodman.4  Robinson’s arguments had been previously 
raised in a prior case she brought seeking disability insurance benefits.  Robinson-Jones 
v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 10-00588 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2012).  In that case, the District 
Court entered judgment in favor of the Commissioner and against Robinson, and she did 
not appeal.  Of the four claims made in her motion for summary judgment, Robinson has 
only raised her “adequate weight” argument in her current appeal.  This Court agrees 
with the District Court that the principles of res judicata apply to Robinson’s claim, and 
we decline to readdress the issue.  See Stauffer v. Califano, 693 F.2d 306, 307 (3d Cir. 
1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957(c)(1), 416.1457(c)(1).   
 The District Court also addressed a fifth argument raised by Robinson in her 
opposition to the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment: that substantial 
evidence did not support the ALJ’s finding that she had the RFC to perform sedentary 
work prior to July 2010.  A liberal reading of her appeal to this Court also raises a 
challenge to the ALJ’s RFC determination.  Accordingly, we will address this argument.   
 The District Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the medical 
evidence, and correctly determined that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was supported by 
substantial evidence.  The RFC assessment is consistent with the advice of Dr. Kennedy 
                                              
4 Robinson also asserted that the Commissioner (1) relied upon a hypothetical question 
that was deficient as a matter of law and not supported by substantial evidence; (2) erred 
in failing to resolve the conflicts between the vocational expert testimony and the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles; and (3) failed to sustain his burden of establishing that 
there is other work in the national economy that she can perform. 
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Yalamanchili, a surgeon who performed Robinson’s cervical discectomy and fusion in 
March 2009, and who advised her only to avoid heavy lifting and repetitive above-the-
shoulder activity.  It is also consistent with a state agency physician who reviewed 
Robinson’s claim for benefits in January 2009.  Regarding Robinson’s alleged mental 
impairments, the District Court properly noted that the ALJ was not required to accept 
the assessment of Ms. Nancy Ball, a licensed clinical social worker.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 
404.1513(a), 416.913(a); cf. Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 361 (a chiropractor's opinion is not an 
acceptable medical source entitled to controlling weight).  The District Court also noted 
that two state agency psychologist who reviewed Robinson’s claim for benefits in 2009 
opined that she did not have a severe mental impairment.  Accordingly, we agree with the 
District Court that the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.  See 
Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 38. 
 For these reasons, and in light of our overall examination of the record, we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.    
 
